"The Austrian Initiative: Jumpstarting Treaty Negotiations"

 On 15 May 1955 at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna, the Austrian government and the four occupying powers of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States signed the Austrian State Treaty, ending ten years of foreign occupation.  This act came at the height of the Cold War and procured the first withdrawal of troops by the Soviet Union from territory it had conquered in World War II.  At the conclusion of war in 1945, the Allied forces marched into Austria with the Soviet Red Army occupying the eastern portion of the country and British, French, and American troops taking control of western areas.  An Allied Commission for Austria was established to administer the country, in conjunction with a democratically elected Austrian government.  As early as 1946 discussions for a treaty on the future of Austria had begun among the Allies, when the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) created a committee of Deputies to work on a draft of the treaty.   In the course of the ten-year occupation, there were several moments when the signing of a treaty appeared imminent but failed for multiple reasons.  The greatest missed opportunity came in 1949 when the Soviets were willing to sign the treaty but the Western Allies, and the United States in particular, could not agree on a response.   After the failure of 1949, progress on the treaty essentially stalled, as the CFM did not meet again until 1954.   The CFM meeting in Berlin in 1954 was one of several important events during the key years from 1953 to 1955.  The year 1953 produced several political changes of great significance to the negotiations over the Austrian State Treaty.  In January 1953, the Eisenhower administration took over control of the White House.  Less than two months later on 5 March 1953, Joseph Stalin died, ending approximately twenty-five years of dictatorial rule.  March also brought the election of a new Austrian government under the chancellorship of Julius Raab.  In this new environment, the Austrians approached the Soviets in bilateral treaty talks in 1953, and the Berlin CFM met in early 1954.  After a lull in activity, Nikita S. Khrushchev consolidated his power as leader of the Soviet Union in 1955, which led to a new line of Soviet foreign policy.  In April 1955, the Austrians again entered into bilateral talks with the Soviets, and one month later the Austrian State Treaty had been signed.  The turning point with regard to the treaty came when the Austrians accepted the Soviet invitation to Moscow in the spring of 1955.  The bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and Austria were the direct catalyst that propelled the four occupying powers and Austria to sign the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May 1955.
 

 The historiography on the Austrian State Treaty breaks down into three main categories: an American, a Soviet, and an Austrian angle.  This does not mean that the historians necessarily fall into these categories based upon nationality or that the boundaries between these categories are solid.  The historians instead argue the importance of the actors and events based on the role of the Americans, Soviets, or Austrians in creating the Austrian State Treaty.  There is also a gray area for some historians, who do not restrict themselves to emphasizing only one political aspect, but recognize that the Austrian treaty required a concerted effort.
 One school of historiography focuses on the role of the Americans in the negotiations.  Stephen E. Ambrose, one of the leading biographers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, significantly emphasizes the President's role in the signing of the Austrian State Treaty.  Ambrose lauds Eisenhower as ". . . the western leader most responsible for the restoration of Austrian freedom."   He bases this assessment on the power of the President in the negotiation process.  In Ambrose's analysis, "[w]hen Eisenhower stepped forward and offered a deal - a summit  for Austria's freedom - the troika [Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Zhukov] overcame their reluctance and on May 15, 1955, signed the Austrian treaty."   While Eisenhower, as leader of the United States, undoubtedly played a role in the signing of the Austrian treaty, Ambrose takes a very narrow view of the treaty negotiations.  He focuses on the top level of American power, thus excluding key figures and events from the Soviet and Austrian sides, as well as other American negotiators. Frederick W. Marks III shares Ambrose's view that the Americans were the crucial players in the negotiations.  Marks focuses, however, on a different figure in terms of American foreign policy.  As a biographer of John Foster Dulles, he credits the Secretary of State with pushing the treaty toward a positive conclusion for both the Americans and the Austrians.  Where Ambrose writes, ". . . Eisenhower's most enduring foreign policy contributions were a free Austria . . .,"  Marks counters with ". . . even to this day, the most astute observers of the Eisenhower presidency still find it difficult to say who was at the helm of American foreign policy from 1953 to 1959."   Marks contends that "Dulles has never received as much as half the recognition he deserves for his role in obtaining the Austrian State Treaty . . .."   He credits Dulles' hard bargaining and delay tactics with the Soviets for producing the treaty.   Marks even uses the anecdote that Dulles "ordered his plane readied for the trip home"  should the Soviets not reduce their demands on the day the treaty was scheduled to be signed. While Marks certainly brings the contributions of Secretary of State Dulles to the forefront, he, too, neglects the work of the Soviets and Austrians in negotiating the treaty.  In referring to Dulles' "eleventh-hour triumph . . . [as] the evacuation of the Red Armies from Austria,"   Marks ignores the fact that when the Viennese crowds came to cheer the signing of the treaty, they were also celebrating the newly achieved independence of their country, including the withdrawal of American troops.   Marks' analysis of Dulles is a one-sided account of the factors influencing the formation of the Austrian State Treaty.
 
The second major category in the historiography debate on the treaty looks at the role of the Soviet leaders and their motives for ending the occupation of Austria.  The Czech historian Vojtech Mastny is one of the strongest proponents in support of the Soviet contribution to the treaty.  In his article, in which he refers to the Soviets as the "Godfathers of Austrian Neutrality ",  Mastny argues that "Austrian neutrality originated in Moscow.  The 1955 State Treaty, which made neutrality possible, could only come about because the key Soviet leaders had changed their mind, and finally approved of a neutral status for Austria."   He argues that the Soviets blocked progress on the treaty negotiations because they refused to separate the German and Austrian question.  As Mastny notes, however, "[m]aking the Austrian settlement contingent upon the prior solution of the German question, and thus postponing both solutions indefinitely, was integral to that Stalinist tactic, whose obsolescence became clear by late 1954."   By 1954 the stage was set for West Germany's integration into NATO, and Mastny argues that Soviet concerns about the expansion of NATO led them to seek the Austrian State Treaty.  By signing a treaty in return for Austrian neutrality, the Soviets initiated ". . . political developments calculated to diminish the cold war's military dimensions. . .."   He also credits Khrushchev with developing this plan to counteract Western military expansion.   Finally, Mastny recognizes the Austrians and the surprising negotiating power they displayed at the bilateral talks in Moscow.   The majority of his article, however, centers on Soviet motives for signing the treaty.  Gerald Stourzh, an Austrian historian, responds to Mastny's analysis with the argument: "If the Soviets were the godfathers, there was also a godmother, in the unlikely person of John Foster Dulles . . .."   Stourzh credits the American Secretary of State for his proposal at the Berlin CFM in 1954, where he suggested that the Western powers would support a neutral Austria on the Swiss model.  He then notes that "this became the Soviets' most persuasive argument in their bilateral talks with the Austrians in Moscow in April 1955 . . .."   In emphasizing Dulles' suggestion, Stourzh refutes Mastny's claim that the Soviets were responsible for Austrian neutrality.  The Soviets instead used the Dulles proposal to negotiate with the Austrian during their bilateral talks in Moscow.  Stourzh also recognizes the Austrian initiative in turning to the Kremlin leaders for bilateral talks ". . . with a purpose of de-blocking the State Treaty issue."   Stourzh is quick to point out, however, that "[t]he non-solution of the Austrian question in 1953 or 1954, and its solution in 1955 depended less on the lesser or greater weight of Austrian 'leverage,'  and more on different power constellations and policy determinations in the Kremlin . . .."   Stourzh's ultimate analysis coincides with Mastny's interpretation of the political motive behind the Soviet signature on the treaty: "What was most essential . . . was the world wide attempt to push back American influence with political rather than military means . . .."   While Stourzh provides a more balanced view of the contributors to the Austrian treaty, he leaves no doubt that without Soviet consent there would not have been a treaty in 1955.

Another Austrian historian, Michael Gehler, provides a different perspective on the motives of the Soviet Union in signing the Austrian State Treaty.  Gehler remarks that ". . . for Kremlin decision makers the withdrawal of occupation forces from the Soviet zone of Austria was designed to send a strong signal for initiating East-West detente in general and solve the German question in particular."   He, too, emphasizes West Germany's impending membership into NATO as a key factor in the decision by Soviet leaders to withdraw from Austria.  Gehler argues that the Kremlin wanted to use Austria to create an alternative example for the Germans.  "Even though the Paris Agreements of October 1954  had been signed, they still were up for ratification in the national parliaments in the spring of 1955.  With the Austrian model for the German question, Kremlin diplomacy hoped to derail the ratification process."   The Soviets hoped to lure the Germans away from Western integration and toward unification and neutrality on the Austrian model.  Gehler notes, however, that Austria succeeded because "[u]nlike the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria did not put its faith in the hands of other powers but negotiated with Moscow on its own."   The Austrian government took a chance in going to Moscow for bilateral talks, but "[t]he courage to take risks paid off: Austria became independent and free."   Gehler recognizes that while the Soviets intended to use the Austrian treaty in a wider diplomatic context, the Austrians were the ultimate beneficiaries of Soviet policy.

 An earlier look at the impact of Soviet policy on the Austrian State Treaty comes from the American historian William Bader.  Bader notes that "[a]fter the death of Stalin in 1953, the style of the Soviet Union's holding action in Austria changed noticeably" but the changes ". . . did not mean that in 1953 Russia was willing to withdraw."   While Stalin's death altered Soviet actions with regard to Austria, Bader also recognizes that the Berlin CFM in 1954 indicated that the Soviet leaders were not yet ready to negotiate solely over Austria but that they intended to link the Austrian question together with that of Germany.   "Not a year later, however, came the volte-face of February 8, 1955,  and the door was opened to an Austrian settlement . . .."   Bader acknowledges the significance of this event in the broader context of Soviet strategy and considers the Austrian treaty to be part of Khrushchev's larger plan to initiate East-West détente.   In a further analysis of Soviet policy, Bader also looks at the Soviet signature on the treaty as attempting to create a model for other European countries.  He remarks that "[t]he most compelling justifications for Khrushchev's action, however, . . . [was] a long-term calculation that the Austrian settlement would serve as a model - an inducement for some to accept demilitarization, for others to point up the advantages of staying out of military alliances."   Bader's analysis also critiques Dulles and the American role in the treaty, noting that "[i]n the Austrian case the United States only grudgingly came to accept the idea of neutrality."   Bader, however, does not give the Austrians any credit for their involvement in seeking a treaty.

 Writing twenty years after Bader, Audrey Kurth Cronin reaches the same conclusion on the importance of Stalin's death.  In her assessment, the death of the Soviet leader not only brought power changes in the Kremlin but also foreign policy changes, particularly concerning the occupation of Austria.   Cronin notes, however, that even in the wake of the power changes, "[t]he disagreement over Austria's future often had little to do with Austria itself and much more to do with the course of the Cold War."   Cronin emphasizes, as other historians also have, that Austria is part of the broader issue of the Western integration of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Soviets refused to separate the two questions.  Her hypothesis is that "[h]ad Soviet threats concerning the future of Austria succeeded in putting off German rearmament, the Austrian State Treaty would probably not have been signed in May 1955."   Cronin thus minimizes the role of the Western powers in favor of the importance of Soviet decisions.  "[I]nternal Soviet considerations and events outside Austria" played a larger part in the signing of the treaty than any of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies.   In her analysis, the key figure in the Soviet decision-making process was Nikita Khrushchev, who intended ". . . to use the treaty to initiate an East-West détente in Europe."   Cronin also addresses the role of the Austrian government in the negotiations.  "Although Austria never controlled its own fate, in the early 1950s the Austrians occasionally exercised a leverage with respect to the Western powers which was out of proportion to the small country's strength."

 The Austrian historian Günter Bischof's assessment of the role the Austrians played in procuring their own freedom forms the final category of historiography.  Bischof's argument for the importance of the Austrians in negotiating their own independence begins with the death of Stalin and "[h]is successors [who] signalled a departure of post-Stalinist foreign policy towards 'peaceful coexistence'."   This change prompted Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab to test "the Soviets in bilateral contacts to explore the meaning of 'peaceful coexistence' for Austria."   Bischof then credits Raab with proposing ". . . neutrality as a means of getting rid of the occupation powers."   In Bischof's analysis, Khrushchev's willingness to negotiate with the Austrians in Moscow was merely ". . . the culmination of Raab's bilateral diplomacy."   Thus, Bischof's conclusion is that "Austria's risky diplomacy and hard-won independence in 1955 demonstrated to the world that the weak had leverage in the Cold War."   Bischof regards as necessary Austria's initiative on the matter of bilateral negotiations to achieve a treaty because the Western powers were slow in reacting to the Soviets.  He criticizes American foreign policy, noting that "Eisenhower refused to negotiate with the Kremlin leadership, let alone meet them on the summit level to test the sincerity of their peace offensive."   Without the Austrians, Bischof's argument indicates that there may not have been a treaty in 1955. In the introduction to his book, Günter Bischof discusses the recent changes in Cold War scholarship.  He notes that new historiography largely looks at new sources, including German language scholarship and the mostly untapped archival sources in Moscow.   This shift in historiography occurs in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the fall of communism across Europe.  Bishop also criticizes "[t]raditional American Cold War scholarship [that] has largely ignored Austria as an important case study contributing to the origins of the Cold War and aggravating East-West conflict."   Stephen Ambrose and Frederick Marks fall into this classification.  They barely touch on the role of Austria in the Cold War, and when they do, it is only to praise their subjects (Eisenhower and Dulles) for solving the Austrian question.  The American historian Bader, writing in the mid-1960s, also leaves the Austrian leaders out of his analysis of Soviet and American actions in treaty negotiations.  The other historians have tried to touch upon multiple factors in their assessment of the formation of the treaty.  Bischof probably goes the farthest by crediting the Austrians with attaining their treaty.  Stourzh and Cronin provide a more balanced view, recognizing that without the Austrian initiative, the lull in treaty negotiations may very well have continued.  Their assessment that the power to make a decision on Austria was always with the Soviets is perhaps the most legitimate.  The Austrian acceptance of Moscow's invitation for bilateral talks in April 1955 jumpstarted the process of negotiations, but the Soviets always maintained the upper hand.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Works Cited
 

Secondary Sources

Ambrose, Stephen E.  "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1950s."  In Contemporary Austrian
Studies, ed. Erich Thöni, et al.  Vol. 3, Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger, 12-23.  New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995.

Bader, William B.  Austria Between East and West 1945-1955.  Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1966.

Bischof, Günter.  Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: The Leverage of the Weak.
Cold War History Series, ed. Saki Dockrill.  New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth.  "East-West Negotiations over Austria in 1949: Turning-Point in
the Cold War."  Journal of Contemporary History 24, no. 1 (January 1989): 125-45.  Database on-line.  Available from JSTOR <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0094%28198901%2924%3A1%3C125%3AENOAI1%3E2.0.0CO%3B2-2> [30 September 2002].

________.  Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955.
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Gehler, Michael.  "State Treaty and Neutrality: The Austrian Solution in 1955 as a
'Model' for Germany?." In Contemporary Austrian Studies, ed. Erich Thöni, et al.  Vol. 3, Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger, 39-78.  New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995.

Marks, Frederick W. III.  Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

Mastny, Vojtech.  "The Soviet Godfathers of Austrian Neutrality."  In Contemporary
Austrian Studies, ed. Günter Bischof, et al.  Vol. 9, Neutrality in Austria, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, 240-50.  New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001.

Stourzh, Gerald. "Reply to the Commentators."  In Contemporary Austrian Studies,
ed. Günter Bischof, et al.  Vol. 9, Neutrality in Austria, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, 278-92.  New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001.