KANT
The
classification of moral acts have generally been separated into three
categories: permissible, obligatory, and forbidden. There are, moreover, some acts which are both obligatory in a
weak sense and not forbidden. These
acts, as developed by Kant are called imperfect duties.[1] Imperfect duties are duties that it would be
right to do but not called wrong if one failed to act on such a duty.[2] Imperfect duties are contrasted with perfect
duties which are duties that one must do and it is wrong if one does not do
them. I will suggest that Kant’
distinction relies on the distinction between a maxim of action and a duty to
act. In other words, at times we have a
duty to act in a certain way. On other occasions we have a duty to determine
our action based on a maxim of action.
The maxim of action, however, does not tells us what particular actions
to carry out. First, I will outline
briefly some of the elements of Kant’s moral philosophy that are essential for
an adequate understanding of Kant on perfect and imperfect duties. Some of the terminology that Kant uses needs
to be examined to make clear what Kant has in mind.
Kant’s project, as is
well known, is both to provide a
"necessary" ground for
morality and construct a pure moral philosophy. In The Metaphysics of
Morals, and more specifically “The Doctrine of Right” Kant outlines some of
the precepts of his moral theory.[3] Perhaps one of Kant’s most important
distinctions is between a hypothetical imperative and a categorical
imperative. Kant tells us clearly that
“moral laws are imperatives (commands
or prohibitions) and indeed categorical (unconditional) imperatives. As such they are distinguished from
technical imperatives (precepts of arts), which always command unconditionally”
(MM 6:221, p. 14). The distinction in
this text between technical and categorical imperative serves the same purpose
as the more commonly rendered distinction between hypothetical and categorical
imperative. Kant’s point is simply that
hypothetical and technical imperatives are done for the sake of some end. The imperative is conditional upon one
desiring to attain a specified end.
Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, imply that certain actions
are either “permitted or forbidden, that is, morally possible or impossible,
while some of them or their opposites are morally necessary, that is
obligatory” (MM 6:221, pp. 14-15).
Furthermore, categorical imperatives do not take into account one's circumstances
or inclinations.
Obligatory actions, for
Kant, lead to a concept of a duty.
First, obligation is understood as “the necessity of a free action under
a categorical imperative of reason” (MM 6:222, p. 15). “Duty is that action which someone is bound”
(MM 6:222, p. 15). We can infer then
that one can have an obligation that binds one in different ways. For instance, obligations are determined by
the imperative of reason. Someone
recognizes that she should not lie, for example. The duty that binds one to that action, is not identical with the
obligation. That I must not lie is
clear. This is a product of the
practical law. That I have a duty not
to lie is derived from the practical law, and as a consequence, can be
expressed in many different ways. This
distinction between duty and obligation is essential. Keep in mind that when Kant makes a distinction between perfect
and imperfect duty he will rely on this distinction.
Let us to turn to the Groundwork.[4] In the Groundwork
Kant distinguishes clearly between the hypothetical and categorical imperative
in section II. Hypothetical imperatives
are those imperatives, as mentioned earlier, that are done for the sake of some
purpose. These imperatives are “good”
in relation to the ends they promote.
Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, are imperatives that are
necessary independent of the ends one is trying to promote. These imperatives are determined by an
application of CI of which Kant says there is but one, namely, “act only on that
maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a
universal law” (G 49). After
identifying CI, Kant proceeds to show us what duties are delineated by this
principle. This is where Kant first mentions
the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. In a footnote, he indicates that this distinction is reserved
“for a future metaphysic of morals” (G 49n1).
The four examples Kant
provides outline the features of perfect and imperfect duties both to one-self
and to others. The suicide example is
emblematic of what Kant considers a perfect duty to one-self. He argues that a person who has been reduced
to despair because of the misfortunes of his life has a perfect duty to
preserve his life. Kant argues that the
maxim of action that the person would have to reflect is the following:
"from self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its
longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction” (G 50). Kant tells us that from self-love we are
compelled to improve our life and that the maxim considered by the person
contemplating suicide stands in contradiction to the principle of
self-love. We see in the example Kant’s
insistence that inclination should play no role in moral decision-making. But does the person have to insist on Kant’s
reference to self-love? Although there
are problems with the application of CI in this example, what is important to
recognize is that Kant claims that the maxim that determines our action leads
to a contradiction.
Kant’s lying-promise
example provides a situation where Kant is pointing to perfect duties to
others. If the maxim of action is
‘whenever I am in need of money I should borrow money even if I know I cannot
repay it,” then Kant say we will clearly see a contradiction. As Kant describes it we cannot will this to
be a universal law because if this maxim were universalized it would lead to a
contradiction. The institution of
promises would make no sense because others would realize that promises were in
reality lying promises and would no longer honor promises. This, in turn, would make it impossible for
people to make promises that they did not intend to keep. As I read it, Kant is suggesting that the
maxim of action both asserts and denies promise-keeping. And that this is a contradiction is
clear. If your maxim of action both
asserts and denies “A”, then the act is forbidden.[5]
Kant’s third example
considers a person’s failure to develop one’s talents. This example illustrates an imperfect duty
to oneself. Could a person will a maxim
to be universal law that would compel him to neglect his talents? Kant argues
that this leads to a contradiction because a human being “necessarily wills
that his faculites be developed, since they serve him...” (G 51). Unlike the first two examples this example
illustrates an imperfect duty. The
difference between the imperfect duty to oneself and the perfect duty of
suicide is the following:
...a human being’s duty to
himself regarding his natural perfection is only wide and imperfect duty; for while it does contain a law for the
maxim of actions, it determines nothing about the kind and extent of actions
themselves but allows a latitude of choice” (MM 6: 446, p. 195)
The perfect
duty, on the other hand, is, in Kantian terms, one that establishes a “narrow”
obligation. In MM 6:389-390 Kant
distinguishes between wide and narrow obligations. Narrow obligations provide laws for actions whereas wide
obligations give only maxims of actions.
“...if the law can prescribe only the maxims of actions, not actions
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves playroom (latitudo) for free choice
in following (complying with) the laws, that is, that the law cannot specify
precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for
an end that it also a duty" (MM 6:390, p. 153).
In the fourth example Kant considers the imperfect duty of charity or beneficence. Could a person will the following maxim to be universal law: Do not help others. Although Kant believes that this maxim of action could be willed as a universal maxim, he argues that a "will that resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of love and the sympathy of others...he would deprive himself of all the help he desires" (G 52). The impossibility of this maxim of action is not then logical but perhaps psychological. Keep in mind that Kant thinks that if one wills a certain end it is necessary that one will also will the means that enable the respective end. What is important, however, is that we recognize that the imperfect duty of beneficence is a product of wide obligation. It gives us a maxim of action not a law for action. Consequently, it does not specify in what way one is supposed to act.
In summary the perfect duties are duties which Kant classifies as those that stem from narrow obligations. These duties promote laws of action. We know if we have a perfect duty what it is that we are supposed to do, e.g., do not commit suicide. With imperfect duties, however, are obligations are wide. The specific action is not determined; what is determined is a maxim for action. Kant identified perfect duties as those duties that were derived from narrow obligations. Narrow obligations are obligations that determine actions. These actions are obligatory in the narrow sense because one cannot act contrary to these duties without involving oneself in a contradiction. Imperfect duties, on the other hand, are those duties that are derived from wide obligations. In other words, the obligation does not tell us precisely what one ought to do, but it determines a maxim of action. His distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, therefore, relies almost exclusively on a formal principle, i.e., the categorical imperative.
[1] "Imperfect duties are accordingly only duties of virtue. Fulfillment of them is merit (meritum)=+a; but failure to fulfill them is not in itself culpability (demeritum)=-a..." Kant. [1797]. The Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor trans. and ed. Cambridge University Press (1996). All references are included in the body of the text with the abbreviation “MM.”. p. 153.
[2]Michael Stocker argues that, for Kant, we never have the duty to do a particular act. If this is the case, then he argues it is never a duty to do an act one has done. Therefore, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties collapses. Michael Stocker. 1967. Acts, Perfect Duties, and Imperfect Duties.” Review of Metaphysics Vol XX, NO. 3, March 1967.
[4]Kant. 1785. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. T.K. Abbott trans. New York: Promotheus Books ( 1987). I will refer to this text as the “Groundwork” in the body of the text. Hereafter I will provide all citations to this work in the body of the text--abbreviated “G.”
[5] Kant recognizes that his examples of perfect duties are negatives duties. In the Metaphysics of Morals when discussing the perfect duties to oneself he writes, "since this chapter deals only with negative duties and so with duties of omission, the articles about duties must be directed against the vices opposed to duties to oneself" (MM6:421).